788 and have the special right to wear white khalats. The number of pilgrims to Mecca is relatively small in Turkestan as a result of the great distance and the difficulty of communications. Usually these pilgrims make their way across Afghanistan and India, and they usually need one or two years for the journey, during which time a large number of them perish either from cholera or other diseases, or as a result of hardships and privations and attacks by robbers. In more recent times, those in more recent times, those in better circumstances choose a more convenient route across Russia and via the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

565 /199/ The alleged descendants of Mohammed, who likewise enjoy a favored position, are designated in Turkestan as 'hodjas'. These are rather numerous, intermarry whenever possible, and therefore constitute a kind of spiritual aristocracy. /Figure 70, p. 40a. Caption: The Gur-Emir mosque with the grave of Tamerlane in Samarkand./ One finds the jodjas in /200/ all possible positions in life, as mullahs (Figure 81, p. 225, p. 59a), tradespeople, craftsmen and peasants. They are probably in reality the descendants of the Arabic conquerors.

741 In addition to the fortuitous gifts bestowed by the believers upon the duvanas, ishans and other religious parasites, their support is also sought through a large number of pious institutions, designated as 'wakf'. By wakf is meant in Moslem countries, all property in mortmain which has been established partly by God-fearing princes, partly by wealthy private individuals for the support of mosques, medreses, cloisters, baths, leper houses, wells, and for poor scholars and students and the like. /Figure 71, p. 40b. Caption: The Hasret mosque in the town of Turkestan./ The wakf property consists partly of landed property, partly of buildings, bazaar booths, caravansaries, mills, etc., and it is managed by special officials, the 'mutevals', who are in charge of the expenditure of the income from the various institutions in accordance with the will of the founder. The wakf institutions are exempt from all taxes and tributes.

[471] When one reflects that, in Turkestan, aside from the constant occasional payments to the duvanas, ishans, and mullahs, a third of the entire land property and national wealth has fallen to the wakf, then one can /201/ easily calculate how great a percentage of the entire population is made up of mullahs, duvanas and ishans, living exclusively at the expense of the working classes, who alone must defray all the state expenditures in addition to this.

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mean that Social Democrats (*i.e.* the Party) will not combat and agitate against the pernicious institutions of nations, and against the inexpedient demands of nations. On the contrary it is the duty of the Party to conduct such agitation and to endeavour to influence the will of nations so that they may arrange their affairs in the way which will best suit the interests of the proletariat.[1]

It is not the national but the agrarian question that will decide the fate of progress in Russia. The national question is a subordinate question.[2]

Proletarian in content and national in form — such is the universal human culture towards which socialism is marching.[3]

I am referring to the deviation towards local native nationalism which is at times to be observed in the ranks of native Communists and which in the East expresses itself in Pan-Islamism and Pan Turkism.[4]

Here then is the Doctrine of the Proletariat, overriding the right of self-determination, and applied to 'native nationalists', who *ex hypothesi* have no proletariat of their own, by a Russian proletariat working through the Party. Leaving aside the instruments of enforcement lurking at every corner, it is hard to think of a series of pronouncements which could be more discouraging to a Central Asian patriot, or less in tune with the proud declaration of the liberty of the colonial peoples to decide on their own future.

THE PARTY

The period from 1918 to 1929 was spent in the integration of these colonial areas with Great Russia, using as instrument the Party. Collectivization had not yet been launched; up to 1929 the aim was to cut off the smaller landholders from their national leaders. Here again it is to be remembered that the Russian peasantry in the countryside and the Russian proletariat on the communications and in the towns were ready to hand to implement a policy. Whatever the theory the Party has always been in fact a single unified structure bound by the tightest possible discipline. To parody Stalin,

[1] Stalin, *op. cit.* p. 53. [2] Stalin, *op. cit.* p. 25. [3] Stalin, *op. cit.* p. 110.
[4] Stalin, report to Communist Party, 10th Mar. 1921, *op. cit.* p. 104.

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it is unitary in content, federal only in form, a solid structure working like an army from the central command. Affairs throughout the Union are controlled from one apex at Moscow. The Party has often been called a monolith; it is perhaps more like a banyan tree, whose branches spread from the central trunk and return to earth sending up fresh trunks all of the same species as the central tree, still nourished from the centre and killing all other growths in the surrounding lands. Party missionaries from this central stem went out to spread the gospel and fight nationalism as Stalin had instructed. The central tree killed any local shrub that tried to root itself on ground which the banyan could reach. In such a conflict the local nationalists had little chance. The wonder is that their resistance was so prolonged.

471 In the cities the authority of the clergy was shaken by the confiscation of religious endowments (*evkaf*). In the settled countryside the land was nationalized, all holdings over a certain area being seized and redistributed, including cattle and agricultural implements considered surplus to the maximum allotment. At the outset a show was made of racial impartiality by confiscating Cossack lands, the Cossacks in the main having been the only Russians who resisted the new régime and the largest Russian landholders on the steppe. (Incidentally, they were the Russians on the best terms with the indigenous population.)

It remained to secure control of the water which is the life-blood of all intensive cultivation in sub-tropical continental tracts. It is broadly true to say that the people of the soil in all lands enjoying an indigenous irrigation system in the Muslim East had worked out over the centuries elaborate systems apportioning responsibilities (for channel maintenance) and rights (to turns of water), usually based on ancient tribal records of the account of profit and loss within a tribe. When older tribal theories of common lands had given way to individual user, the water continued to be regarded as a common possession to be distributed in accordance with a well-known roster, disputes being settled by the chief. For

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nearly a decade from the time of introduction of their collective drive in 1929 to wear down the free Kazaks and Kirghiz, the nomads of the steppe and the mountain, to the point at which in 1936 they thought it safe to treat them on an equal footing with the settled Uzbeks in the south. Yet academic argument continues on questions such as that posed above, research bodies quote blueprints, and argue like Stalin from first principles. The more involved and philosophic the discussion, the less account it seems to take of the concrete case, the actual cost in human suffering. And even those who enter the lists against the Soviet apologist are apt to speak in terms of thousands or millions of human lives from the standpoint of recorders of casualties in some phantom war. The spirit and the dignity of man is given no place in all these bickerings.

Let us try to see what really befell the men and women of Kazakistan of 1929. By that year a centralized control had been imposed in the areas of settled cultivation in Soviet Central Asia; hereditary leaders of the people had been pulled down by confiscations from their position in city and field and, less certainly, from their paramountcy on the steppe also; land and water had been nationalized and, after taking a large share for the *Sovkhozes* or state farms, redistributed in an arbitrary fashion. But here more than elsewhere in the USSR up to 1928 Lenin's New Economic Policy had given some freedom at least to the small man; small-holders still worked on lands they counted their own, yoking their own oxen to the plough, milking their own cattle, riding their own horses; herdsmen roamed the steppe or hillside tending their own flocks and herds of camels, cattle, horses, sheep and goats; both brought their produce to market in cart or on hoof—grain, vegetables, fruit, eggs and chickens, milk, cheese and meat — and sold it in shops at reasonable prices. Except that the chiefs and big men had been removed, the social and economic system of agricultural production and distribution remained much as it had been before the Revolution. On the steppe and in the mountains there even remained vestiges of

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471 an aristocracy. All this was to be violently changed by centralized decree from the Kremlin, a second Russian Revolution.

The outward shape of what was then conceived and carried through has often been described. The whole conception was indeed two-headed — to collectivize and mechanize agriculture, and use the displaced peasants and nomads as unskilled labour for the new industries which were being set up. The American mining engineer Littlepage,[1] who saw it all from the inside, describes well both the central conception and the manner of its execution.

> A conversation something like the following must have taken place at headquarters in Moscow. One of the big Communists said 'Well, what will we do about it? We can't put through our plans for industry unless we have a few million workers who will stay put. There will be too much of a howl if we simply make the free workers stay where they are. What can we do?' And someone would answer, 'Why not liquidate the Kulaks? We can kill two birds with one stone, get these obstinate small farmers away from the villages where they obstruct our scheme for collectivization and at the same time get plenty of industrial labor which will stay put because it is under police guard.'

THE PEASANTRY

474 661 He goes on to tell what he saw of the peasants being dragooned round the country under police escort and set down as forced labour to work in mines and factories. Men, women and children were driven out of their houses, and their furniture, domestic animals and all but a few clothes were taken from them, the confiscated houses being taken into use as clubs and offices. Some were herded along the camel-trails, others, packed like animals in cattle trucks, in stifling heat or bitterness of winter, were despatched by rail to centres where their labour was needed. Many died of hunger, cold or disease on the way. All seemed completely bewildered; they had lost their homes, had been forcibly removed from

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 78.